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1 Introduction
Fostering the labour market inclusion of older and unhealthy workers is indeed a daunting
task among those appearing in the economic policy agenda of many countries. While social security
sustainability calls for extending working lives as a policy priority, this comes at the cost of an
increased chance for older workers to experience health deteriorations. Policy makers are thus
compelled to face complex choices, trading-off the provision of incentives to remain active, and the
protection that motivates social insurance institutions.
In such scenario, empirical evidence on how workers’ labour market performance is affected
after a health deterioration experienced in a particular institutional setting, is crucial for shaping
the policy agenda. Insights on the issues at stake represent a primary step for identifying the kind
of policy interventions that could be recommended. Indeed, existing evidence has produced so far
a relative consensus on the existence of a detrimental effect (Currie and Madrian, 1999) of health
shocks on labour and other socioeconomic outcomes: first and foremost, labour market participation
(Jones et al, 2019; Au et al, 2005; García Gòmez et al., 2010; Bradley et al, 2013), but also hours
worked (Moran et al, 2011; Cai et al, 2014), labour income (Flores et al., 2019; García Gòmez and
Lopez Nicolas, 2006; Halla and Zweimüller, 2013; Moller Dano, 2005), and even wealth, due to
increased health expenditures (Dobkin et al., 2018; Wu, 2003).
However, a recurrent limitation of this literature, and to its potential for informing policy
design, is that results are typically confined to a short time horizon. Except for a few cases providing
evidence for up to 6 years (García Gòmez et al. 2013; Moller Dano, 2005 and Moran 2011), the bulk
of works covers about one to three years after the health shock occurrence, due to reasons involving
a combination of data availability and identification strategy credibility1. In this way though, the
picture remains pretty partial. On the one hand, a thorough assessment of the adverse socioeconomic
consequences of health deteriorations should account for possibly cumulative detrimental effects
arising over time. For example, a labour market exit observed in the short term, and intended to
be temporary because meant to foster health recovery, could become permanent in the longer run,
particularly in rigid labour market settings offering more limited opportunities of re-entry to older
’outsiders’. On the other hand, a return to employment or a recovery in earnings could emerge
only in the medium to long run, through health improvements or the development of different forms
of disability-specific human capital. For example Charles (2003) finds, in the US, the immediate
reduction in earnings to be then followed by a recovery, evident since the first two post-onset years.
No less important than the timeframe, for policy design purposes, comes devoting at-
tention to the peculiarity of the institutional setting (Arpaia and Mourre, 2012; Holmlund, 2014)
where the empirical evidence is drawn. Recent comparative evidence from European countries has
1Credible identification strategies generally rely on observing information on previous labour and health histories, which
then results in a reduced observational window for analysing the post-shock outcomes dynamic.
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shown that labour responses to the same health shock can vary substantially across heterogeneous
labour market, social insurance and healthcare system settings. Both García Gòmez (2011) and Tre-
visan and Zantomio (2016) found, in the short term, stronger employment contractions (following a
health shock) in Nordic countries2, characterised by more generous disability benefits (both in terms
of access rates and replacement income) and high job mobility, in comparison to other European
countries.
Actually, institutional differences represent a precious source of identification for the role
played by particular policy instruments or institutional features. In this respect, the bulk of existing
works have been produced on Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Jones et al, 2019; Dobkin et al, 2018;
Moran et al, 2011; Au et al., 2005; Coile, 2004; García Gom´ez et al., 2010; Zucchelli et al., 2010),
Nordic countries, (e.g. Datta Gupta et al 2011; Lundborg et al., 2015; Moller Dano, 2005; Heinesen et
al, 2013; Maczulskij and Bockerman, 2019), and the Netherlands (García Gom´ez et al., 2013). Such
pattern reflects these countries’ more generous availability of appropriate data sources, which have
sometimes allowed exploring subgroups responses (by gender, or education, see e.g. Moller Dano,
2005; Lundborg et al., 2015; Heinesen et al, 2013), also useful to draw policy inference. However,
in comparative terms (OECD, 2014; OECD, 2016; EC, 1999; EC, 2009), these countries generally
feature high job mobility3 and a more limited role for job protection legislation (such as obligations
for firms to employ a mandatory quota of disabled workers). This partial view casts doubts on
the obtained results’ robustness to different institutional environments, such as Southern European
countries, generally4 featuring highly regulated labour markets, typically resulting in comparatively
low labour flow indicators (EC, 2009; OECD, 2016); and therefore questions the appropriateness of
possibly extending the potential policy recommendations drawn there, to these other settings.
This work offers a contribution towards these limitations of an otherwise undoubtedly
developed stream of literature, by measuring the effect of health shocks on labour outcomes until up
to 9 years later, in Italy, a country characterised by a highly regulated labour market and high job
protection by European standards, as explained in Section 2. In more detail, we study the outcomes
of blue-collar male workers, aged 18 to 64 years old, hit by acute forms of cardiovascular diseases
(CVD) between 2003 and 2005, namely myocardial infarction (ischemic heart disease) and stroke (a
cerebrovascular disease), which typically result in an unplanned hospitalisation (Braunwald et al.,
2015).
Multiple reasons underpin the choice of focussing on these CVD shocks. On the one
hand, there is policy interest. CVDs represent a source of major human and economic cost in
2Followed by the UK, in Trevisan and Zantomio (2016) (while UK is not covered in García Gòmez 2011) a country featuring
less generous disability benefits than Nordic countries but a tight labour market, in comparative terms.
3With the notable exception of the Netherlands, featuring comparatively low hiring rates: in 2006 the hiring rate for older
workers (ages 55-64: measured as the number of employees with job tenure of less than one year as a percentage of total
employees) was 1.7 (against an OECD average of 9.2).
4One exception though is Spain, featuring high hiring rates (in 2006 the hiring rate for older workers was 7.7, while the same
indicator was 4.0 for Italy- against an OECD average of 9.2). For evidence on the consequences of health shocks in Spain, see
García Gom´ez and Lopez Nicolas (2006).
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developed countries (Wilkins et.al., 2017)5. Over the past 25 years, the incidence of CVD cases
has increased in most European countries, including Italy6. In 2015, the incidence of myocardial
infarction was 2,968,582 among males and 2,784,341 among females; while new cases of stroke were
675,872 among males and 879,493 among females. Data on the crude prevalence for the same year
depict an impressive situation: more than 85 million people across Europe were living with CVDs7,
myocardial infarction representing one of the most prevalent conditions, with corresponding costs
estimated in about e59 billion a year. The cost of stroke was estimated in e45 billion per year.
While CVDs are among the leading causes of death in developed countries, survival rates have
remarkably improved over the past decades8. Upon survival, these types of health deteriorations
often lead to serious physical and mental impairments limiting most daily-life activities and also
work-capabilities.
Besides policy interest, the choice of focussing on CVD shocks relates to the endogeneity
challenge that plagues empirical research on the relationship between health and labour (Haan and
Myck, 2009; Cai, 2010). Grossman (1972) seminal contribution, based on Becker (1964), intro-
duced a model of health production where people are endowed with a depreciable stock of health
capital, restorable with additional investment. While additional economic resources may increase
health through such investment, the health stock enhances socioeconomic outcomes through exten-
ded working times and higher earnings. At the empirical level, the main resulting implication is
that health must be treated as endogenous, with respect to labour (Currie and Mandrian (1999)),
or in other words, identification of health effects is to be based on exogenous sources of variation in
health9. As pointed out by Smith (1999), particular forms of major health shocks might represent
a source of unexpected variation in health: indeed, although people may anticipate to some extent
the onset of a certain illness, or their underlying risk, the actual realisation and its timing come
as unexpected. Previous authors (Smith, 1999, 2005; Coile, 2004; Datta Gupta et al., 2011; Tre-
visan et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2019; Bradley et al., 2013) have studied the consequences of selected
subgroups of major health shocks, which typically included CVD shocks, cancer and lung diseases.
The advantage of selecting only acute CVD conditions, such as myocardial infarction and stroke for
identification purposes, relates to their local time-specific onset (Braunwald et al., 2015), in contrast
to other health condition, whose onset is hardly referable to a specific point in time.
Studying the labour outcomes consequences of CVD shocks in the Italian institutional
5Both direct health costs, productivity loss and informal care costs are considered in the total estimated cost.
6In Europe, new CVD cases were 4,467,489 (5,013,645) among males (females) in 1990 compared with 5,441,564 (5,842,358)
new cases in 2015, showing a percentage increase of 21% (16%). In Italy there were 293,767 (300,865) new cases among males
(females) in 1990 compared to 359,888 (371,869) cases in 2015.
7The more than 30 million of CVD cases among males (34 million for females) in 1990 have increased to more than 41
million cases (44 million for females) in 2015. Age-standardised prevalence rates show instead a decline over the 25 years period
in Europe, for both genders.
8For men in particular, CVD diseases represent the most common cause of death under 65 years old (31%) in Europe
(compared to about 22% of deaths related to cancer). For women aged below 65 years old, CVD shocks are the second largest
cause of death (26%), after cancer (35%).
9For example, Moller-Dano(2005) and Halla et al. (2013) consider respectively accidents occurred on the way to and from
work, road accidents in general; García Gom´ez et al. (2013) and Lindeboom et al. (2016) consider unplanned hospitalisations.
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context is possible thanks to a unique opportunity in the national panorama, the availability of a
new administrative dataset, WHIP&Health, described in more detail in Section 3.2. WHIP&Health
covers the work and social security histories of a 7% random sample drawn from the Italian So-
cial Security (INPS) archives from 1990 to 2012, which are linked to individuals’ hospital discharge
records from all private and public hospitals, between 2001 and 2012. The availability of admin-
istrative data on acute CVD shock hospitalisations allows overcoming several measurement error
challenges typically encountered when approaching the subject using survey data, spanning from
recall and justification biases, to pure filling errors (Jackle and Himmler, 2010; Benitez-Silva et al.,
2004; Baker et al., 2004).
While the topic areas covered by WHIP&Health, as generally by other administrative
data, remain limited in scope with respect to survey data, the wide time window covered gives the
opportunity to exploit a very long record of labour market and social insurance information, up to 15
years before the health shock occurrence. Conditioning on such a long history of health, labour and
social insurance variables, we assume the conditional probability for a worker to experience a CVD
health shock or not, at a particular point in time, to be as good as random. Also, by conditioning
on lagged outcomes, we remove the bias stemming from time invariant unobservables, on top of time
varying observables. Following Jones et al. (2019), the identification strategy detailed in Section
3.1 is implemented through a combination of Coarsened Exact Matching and Entropy Balancing
matching procedures, followed by parametric estimation of the Average Treatment effect on the
Treated (ATT) for employment, labour activity (including also self-employment and atypical work),
the probability of working full, rather than part-time, annual labour income and hourly wage.
Results, presented in Section 4, reveal that, in the current Italian institutional setting,
acute CVD shocks cause a significant and sizeable reduction in employment. The probability of
exiting employment one year after the shock is increased of one third, with respect to its baseline
value. The dynamic pattern over the nine years past the shock shows an employment reduction that
peaks three years past the shock, and displays only a minor recovery thereafter. After nine years, the
drop in employment reaches a value that, in terms of relative size, is four times larger than the effect
observed in the first year. Moreover, loss of employment is not compensated by increased chances of
transition to other forms of work, i.e. self-employment or atypical work. The shock-induced loss of
employment entails a substantial income loss, also persisting up to nine years after, and amounting
to more than 10% of the counterfactual value since the first year past the shock. For those who
maintain employment, no significant adjustment in terms of working hours emerges in the short run.
The probability of working full- versus part-time registers a slight reduction between two and five
years after the health event, driven by individuals hit by stroke, but the effect substantially fades
for workers remaining active after then, up to nine years past the shock. Wage dynamics after the
shock reveal a small negative effect of health shocks, arising from lower wage growth, with respect to
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the counterfactual. Interestingly, a systematic gradient in the size of the effect by firm size emerges,
consistent with the higher employment protection legally granted to workers in large firms. Overall,
results suggest that, in a highly regulated institutional setting like the Italian labour market, there
appears to be limited scope for workers to flexibly adjust working times on the one side, and for
employers to adjust the wage of lower productivity workers, on the other. This might force some
workers, who would have preferred to remain active under a reduced working time and/or under
adjusted wages, to withdraw from the labour force; and at the same time, might favor the dismissal
of less healthy workers: in both cases with remarkable labour income losses to be borne. Such
evidence questions the appropriateness of existing labour inclusion policies for unhealthy workers,
besides their income opportunities.
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2 Institutional background
When looking at comparative labour market institutions indicators over the period covered
by our study (1990-2012), the Italian labor market emerges as highly regulated one. The value of
the Strictness of Employment Protection10 OECD indicator (ranging 0 to 5) for Italy scores 2.76
(in the period 1990-end 2011, decreasing to 2.68 in 2012), a value close to other Southern European
countries (e.g. Greece, 2.8) but much higher than for Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. UK, 1.1) and for
OECD countries as a whole (2.08, in 2012).
In Italy, employment protection has historically been particularly high for workers on
open-ended contracts in medium and large companies (i.e. firms with more than 15 employees).
Their dismissal was in facts not allowed11 during most of the time period we study. Legal safeguards12
have been later reduced, since 2011; in more detail, the 2012 ’Monti-Fornero’ reform introduced
the possibility of dismissal for economic reasons, significantly lowering firing restrictions previously
applying to medium and large companies. Employees in small firms (i.e. up to 15 employees, a
widespread case in the Italian productive panorama, also in comparison with all the other OECD
countries)13 or under fixed term-contracts (which remain relatively marginal in comparative terms,
particularly for older workers, more exposed to health shocks)14 have historically, and throughout
the period we consider, relied on remarkably lower levels of employment protection.
High regulation, in comparative terms, emerges also from the OECD Trade unions and
Collective Bargaining indicators. The Collective bargaining coverage rate is 80 percent for Italy
(years 1998-2016), similarly to Spain, Portugal and Greece before the crisis, against an OECD
average of 33 percent. Although a legal minimum wage does not exist in the country, it is de facto
otherwise set through collective bargaining agreements on a sector-by-sector basis. In comparative
terms, the compensation structure emerges as particularly rigid: in facts, Italy stands out as having
a completely different profile for lifecycle trajectories of hourly wages than other countries (Contini,
2009). Strikingly, for many years, Italy has been the only European country where remuneration was
10Referring to individual dismissals in regular contracts.
11Reinstatement of the worker was the sanction the employer was subject to in case of unlawful dismissal.
12Based on Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute (Law No. 300 of May 20, 1970). In 2011, an attempt to circumvent article 18
was introduced by the Berlusconi government (Law 148, September 2011, art. 8). This law allowed for collective agreements at
the plant or local level ("proximity agreements") to derogate from national collective agreements and the law in various matters,
including the possibility to permit compensation in lieu of reinstatement in case of unlawful dismissal in larger firms’ apparently
even if acting against the guidelines issued by peak-level unions (Berton et.al., 2012). The application of article 8 Law 148
was limited due to the fear of a massive number of lawsuits triggered by the unions. The Fornero-Monti reform of employment
law, which came into force in July 2012, rewrote in total article 18 of the Workers’ Statute, providing different regulations
for different types of dismissal. Its most relevant novelty concerns the possibility for a firm with more than 15 employees to
dismiss workers for economic reasons. In this type of dismissal, the employee cannot claim his job back and has only right to an
indemnity ranging from 12 to 24 months of salary, the sum being decided by a court. The Fornero-Monti reform thus lessened
the restrictions to firing In Italy significantly.
13Italy is the second leading OECD country by number of micro-businesses (319k firms with 0 to 9 persons employed) preceded
only by Turkey, while is third by number of small size business (40k firms with 10-19 persons employed) preceded only by the
US (OECD, 2017). Micro-businesses represented 95% of all Italian firms in 2015 (all sectors), while firms with 10-49 employees
an additional 4.1% (ISTAT, 2017).
14According to OECD (2016), the incidence of temporary work for those aged 55-64 was 6.4 per cent in 2006, decreasing to
5.8 in 2016, against corresponding OECD figures amounting to 8.9 and 7.9 respectively.
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not declining at older ages15 because, as long as open-ended contracts were prevailing, particularly
in large firms, wages were linked to seniority until retirement16. This type of wage adjustment
contributes to shaping a highly regulated market, where firms can hardly adjust working hours,
require overtime work, make workers redundant, and no firm level negotiations generally occur
(Contini, 2019). More in detail, Devicienti et al. (2007) provide evidence of a sizeable amount of
downward wage rigidity in Italy, with a prevalence of real over nominal rigidity.
High downward wage rigidity might result in frictions that increase labor mobility and
workers reallocations (see Devicienti et.al., 2007, using WHIP data for the period 1985-1999). Indeed,
although highly regulated, the Italian labor market has been characterised by hiring rate and labor
turnover indicators that during the 1980s and the 1990s were middle-way between central European
and Anglo-Saxon countries (OECD 1994, Contini, 2019). More recently, in the years 2002-2007
(covered by European Commission (2009)), Italy is found among the bottom positions in terms
of hiring, separations and turnover (European Commission,2009). More disaggregated statistics on
labor mobility in the country can be found in Contini (2019), based on Italian administrative data for
the period 1991-201217. Interestingly, the hiring rate in small firms is about 50 percent, declining to
a value of 25 percent for firms with more than 200 employees, where stricter employment protection
legislation applies.
The incidence of part-time contracts has been increasing at a fast pace during the last two
decades; this increase has led Italy to register, in 2018, a higher incidence of part time (18.8%) than
the average OECD countries18. However, the majority of part time in the country is involuntary: in
2018, the share of voluntary part-timers as a % of total employment was 6.9% (the residual 11.9%
being involuntary). Moreover, the share of voluntary part time is even lower if one focuses on males
(1.5%), slightly increasing for older males (aged 55 to 64: 3.1%). These are astonishing figures if
compared with the corresponding OECD values, where the share of voluntary part-timers in total
employment is equal to 13.4% (all ages, both genders), 7.5% (males, all ages), and 7.1% (older males)
(OECD, 2019). Also, evidence from Eurostat (2019) revels that prevalence of part-time contracts,
among male workers aged 45 or older and suffering health-related limitations, is only 12%, a figure
that places Italy in penultimate position among EU28 countries.
In case of sickness, blue collar workers are entitled to paid sickness leave, which is granted
for a maximum of 180 days (about six months) per calendar year. Combining the public benefit
rate with further compensations obtained through collective bargaining agreements results in a full
15Whereas in Nordic countries and the UK wages peak at around 45 years old, and then start decreasing, in Italy wages
continue to increase until 60 years old.
16After 1991, Italy experienced a trend of declining union power and increasing role of local wage setting. Nevertheless, the
influence of local wage bargaining has always been modest. Devicienti et.al. (2007) report a wage drift of about 1 percent.
17Based on WHIP data (note that the frequency of WHIP is monthly: therefore, indicators of labor mobility cannot be com-
pared with the European Commission ones, based on EU-LFS, which is quarterly). Open-ended contracts appear characterised
by separation rates regularly greater than association rates; for these contracts, the value of labor turnover has been constant
over time around a value of 25 percent, implying a surprisingly low average length of open-ended contracts of 4 years.
18In Italy, the incidence of part-time on the total employment was 11.7 percent in 2000, to reach a value of 18.8 percent in
2018. The corresponding values for the OECD are 13.9% and 16.5%.
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replacement rate19. After 180 days, if work is not resumed, the employer may rescind the contract.
Still, further protection against health-related income risk is offered though two types of
welfare schemes targeted at disabled workers. The first is a temporary disability benefit (assegno
ordinario di invaliditá) in case of certified mental or physical impairment leading to a reduction
in working capacity by at least two-thirds. The entitlement lasts three years, and, upon medical
screening, can be renewed for up to three times, until it becomes permanent. Noticeably, the tem-
porary disability benefit is compatible with working activity; and while being earnings-tested, the
earnings-related reduction applies to high income levels20. The second disability-related benefit is a
very generous permanent disability pension (pensione di inabilitá) paid to claimants who, after med-
ical screening, result in permanent and total impossibility of performing any kind of work activity21.
This payment is incompatible with any type of paid work.
19By law, the benefit is equal to 50% of the average daily earnings for the first 20 days and to 66.66% of it for the following
days. The first three days (’periodo di carenza’) are not paid. Generally, however, collective bargaining agreements provide
a more generous coverage, with benefits raised up to 100 percent of the remuneration and extended to the first three days of
sickness.
20The benefit is reduced by 25% (50%) when labour income is greater than four (five) times the minimum pension (i.e.
e26676,52 or e33.345,65 in 2019).
21Additional requirements to claim these benefits are five years of enrolment to Social Security and at least three years of
contributions in the previous five.
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3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Identification strategy
Ideally, the causal effect of health deterioration on labour would be measured as the
difference in individual labour outcome Yi,t observed for individual i at time t, simultaneously in
two states of the world. In the first, the CVD shock event T occurs for individual i at time t¯ (Ti,t¯
= 1), yielding outcome Y 1i,t; in the other, for the same individual, it does not (Ti,t¯ = 0), yielding
outcome Y 0i,t. In that case, we could estimate the average treatment effects on the treated (i.e. on
individuals’ hit by the CVD shock) ATTt¯+ν at time t¯+ ν, i.e. ν years after the CVD shock, as:
E[Y 1i,t¯+ν − Y 0i,t¯+ν |Ti,t¯ = 1] = E[Y 1i,t¯+ν |Ti,t¯ = 1]− E[Y 0i,t¯+ν |Ti,t¯ = 1]
In practice though, an individual will only experience - and be observed - in one state, implying that
the two potential health states (Ti,t¯ = 1 ,Ti,t¯ = 0), and the corresponding labour outcomes (Y 0i,t, Y
1
i,t)
are never simultaneously observed. The potential outcome approach tackles the evaluation problem
modelling the counterfactual unobserved outcome under the assumption of unconfoundedness, or
conditional independence (Rosembaum and Rubin, 1983). In our context, the assumption can be
formulated as:
(Y 0i,t, Y
1
i,t) ⊥ Ti,t¯|(Wi, Xi,t¯−s) s = 1...S
where Wi represents the individual time invariant characteristics, and Xi,t¯−s the time varying ones,
including labour, social insurance and health histories, observed s years before the shock, up to past
time S. Under unconfoundedness, conditioning on the observablesWi and Xi,t¯−s makes both poten-
tial outcomes independent w.r.t the treatment status, and the conditional probability of experiencing
an acute CVD shock in t¯, as good as random. The assumption would be violated if unobservables
systematically differed between individuals experiencing the Ti,t¯ = 0 and those experiencing the Ti,t¯
= 1 states. Therefore, while untestable, its credibility crucially relies on the scope of the available
data, a point to which we come back in the following section, after presenting our data in more de-
tail. A second assumption for identification requires some overlap in the distribution of observables
Wi and Xi,t¯−s between individuals experiencing, and not experiencing, the health shock, so that for
both, the conditional treatment probability is:
0 < pr(Ti,t¯ = 1|Wi = w,Xi,t¯−s = x) < 1
Under both assumptions, i.e. under strong ignorability (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), the ATTt¯+ν
at time t¯+ ν, i.e. ν years after the CVD shock, denoted by τt¯+ν , is identified as:
τt¯+ν ≡ E[Y 1i,t¯+ν − Y 0i,t¯+ν |Wi = w,Xi,t¯−s = x]
≡ E[Y 1i,t¯+ν |Wi = w,Xi,t¯−s = x]− E[Y 0i,t¯+ν |Wi = w,Xi,t¯−s = x]
10
3.2 Data, sample selection and research design implementation
WHIP&Health is an administrative dataset that combines the work and social insurance
histories with the health histories of a 7% random sample of workers covered by the Italian Social
Security System (INPS) i.e. all private sector workers, excluding agriculture.
The first component, i.e. the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), spanning from 1990
to 201222, is a rich employer-employee database collecting detailed information for each employment
contract (e.g. qualification, sector of activity, firm, firm dimension, labour income). Further inform-
ation available includes other types of working spells (i.e. self-employment or atypical work), and
non-working spells, such as unemployment. Information on a variety of social security programmes
is also available. Information on death is generally not available (except for deaths occurring during
hospitalisation, captured in the health component).
The health component is drawn from the hospital discharge records (or SDO i.e. Schede di
dimissione ospedaliera) registry maintained by the Italian Ministry of Health and collects information
on all types of hospitalisations occurred between 2001 and 2014. Variables include the main and the
secondary diagnoses, accordingly to the ICD codes (ICD-IX), the year and month of hospitalisation
and the type of dismissal (which allows identifying death occurred in the hospital). We identify
unplanned hospitalisations related to an acute CVD shock onset (ischemic, codes: ICD-IX 410-414;
or cerebrovascular, codes: ICD-IX 430-434 and 436-437) which does not result in death, before
reaching or while staying at the hospital. Figure 1 clarifies the time window covered respectively by
the labour and social insurance (WHIP), and health (SDO) components of WHIP&Health, and how
these are exploited to implement the research design.
Figure 1: Dataset time coverage and related identification strategy
For the unconfoundedness assumption to be credible, one needs to observe as much previ-
ous labour and health history information as possible: therefore, the identification strategy requires
a sizeable time widow for observing pre-shock characteristics. On the other hand though, the re-
search question is centred around the chance of evaluating the effect of a health shock in the longer
22Previous years would also be available, from 1985, but useless for our purposes due to lower coverage and high frequency
of missing information.
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term. Trading-off the two, we place the treatment time window of CVD shocks occurrence in the
years 2003-2005. This allows observing up to s=15 years of previous labour and social insurance
history (i.e. for individuals experiencing the CVD shock in 2005, with WHIP available variables
dating back to 1990), and up to ν=9 years of labour outcomes past the health shock onset year (i.e.
for individuals experiencing the CVD shock in 2003, with WHIP available variables dating back to
1990).
The sample for analysis includes male individuals who, in any year between 2003 and
2005, were observed in employment as blue-collars, and aged 18-64 years old. The first two restric-
tions reflect limitations of the underlying WHIP data with respect our identification strategy needs.
In more detail, for women, besides lack of reliable information on fertility, the scope of available
information on history would be significantly reduced due to their more discontinuous employment
patterns, and lack of corresponding information in WHIP (which captures only job or social security
spells). The exclusion of white-collar workers is motivated by lack of information on their sickness
leave, which is not captured in WHIP (while it is, in the case of blue collars). Sickness leave rep-
resents a crucial confounder that allows capturing health-related information for up to 15 previous
years, with the SDO time frame being limited to up to 4 years prior the CVD shock occurrence.
Because of unobserved heterogeneity concerns, we further restrict the sample to those who had not
experienced an acute CVD shock in 2001 and 2002 i.e. the two years before the treatment obser-
vational window, and to individuals who could claim four previous years of employment since 1990.
We further drop cases with missing or inconsistent information on relevant variables.
The resulting working sample consists of 326,337 individuals: among them, 1,629 experi-
ence an acute CVD shock between 2003 and 2005 (i.e. 506 in 2003, 556 in 2004 and 567 in 2005) and
represent the ’treated’ subsample. While they might potentially experience recurrent CVD events
within the treatment window, we consider the first shock observed within the 2003-2005 window
as the reference shock. In line with the national and international trends23, most cases involve an
myocardial infarctions (76,98%), and about one in four (23,02%) are cerebrovascular diseases. The
subsample of those who do not experience any acute CVD shock between 2003 and 2005, amounts
to 324,708 individuals.
Table 1 describes the full set of variables that we exploit to credibly implement the iden-
tification strategy outlined in section 3.1: besides basic demographics and health history variables,
they include a strikingly rich battery of retrospective labour and social security history information,
reconstructing the workers’ past for up to 15 previous years. We derive multiple summary indicator of
labour market trajectories, as well as time-and job-specific characteristics for previous employments,
aiming at substantially reducing the potential influence of time-varying unobservables, captured to
23Wilkins E, Wilson L, Wickramasinghe K, Bhatnagar P, Leal J, Luengo-Fernandez R, Burns R, Rayner M, Townsend N
(2017). European Cardiovascular Disease Statistics 2017. European Heart Network, Brussels.
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the extent they are correlated with observed confounders. Notably, we also include time-specific
lagged outcomes, which allow removing any bias that would stem from time-invariant unobservables
(O’Neill et al., 2016). Indeed unobserved heterogeneity concerns might arise, for example, from lack
of available information on genetic or behavioural risk factors (e.g. smoking, eating habits, physical
activity) correlated with labour market outcomes. However our results would not be invalidated, if,
besides genetic invariance over time, the above mentioned behaviours are deemed as pretty stable
over time (in which case their effect would be purged via lagged outcomes inclusion). Full descriptive
statistics for our working sample are reported in Appendix, Table A1.
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Table 1: Variables description
Variable Name Description
Time and demographic characteristics
Year Year (of CVD shock, for the treated)
Age Age (when the CVD shock occurs, for the treated)
Abirth_north Area of birth (north)
Abirth_center Area of birth (center)
Abirth_south&Isl. Area of birth (south or islands)
Abirth_abroad Area of birth (abroad)
Country_underdev Equal to 1 if the person comes from an underdeveloped country
Health History
Hosp_cvd_cum Equal to 1 if the person ever had a hospitalisation for cardiovascular diseases until (t¯-1)
Days_cvd_cum Number of days spent in hospitals for a cardiovascular shock until (t¯-1)
Hosp_other_cum Equal to 1 if the person ever had a hospitalisation for other diseases until (t¯-1)
Days_other_cum Number of days spent in hospitals for other type of diseases until (t¯-1)
Hosp_other_(t¯-1) Number of hospitalisations for other types of diseases in (t¯-1)
Days_other_(t¯-1) Number of days spent in hospitals for other types of diseases in (t¯-1)
Inv_benefit_cum Equal to 1 if the person ever received ordinary invalidity benefits until (t¯-1)
Sick_leave_cum Number of weeks in sick leave until (t¯-1)
Labour History
Work_active_cum Number of years the person is observed as employee, self-employed or atypical worker, until (t¯-1)
Nemployee_cum Number of contracts as employee until (t¯-1)
Rate_employee_cum Percentage of years as an employee over the total observed as a worker, until (t¯-1)
Jobloss_cum Number of involuntary job losses experienced until (t¯-1)
New_firm_cum Number of firms changed until (t¯-1)
Nblue_collar_cum Number of contracts as blue-collar until (t¯-1)
Nwhite_collar_cum Number of contracts as white-collar until (t¯-1)
Nmanager_cum Number of contracts as manager until (t¯-1)
Rate_perm_cum Percentage of permanent contracts on the total as an employee until (t¯-1)
Rate_fullt_cum Percentage of full-time contracts and the total as an employee until (t¯-1)
Ever_CIG Equal to 1 if the person ever been in "cassa integrazione guadagni" until (t¯-1)
Nunempl_cum Number of unemployment benefits received until (t¯-1)
Unempl_(t¯-1) Equal to 1 if the person received unemployment benefits in (t¯-1)
Rate_selfempl_cum Percentage of years as self-employed over the total observed as a worker until (t¯-1)
Days_self_cum Total number of days as self-employed until (t¯-1)
Rate_atypical_cum Percentage of years as atypical worker over the total observed as a worker until (t¯-1)
N_atypical_cum Total number of contracts as atypical worker until (t¯-1)
Characteristics of the last (pre-shock) job as employee
Dist_last1_employee Distance between the treatment year and the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Dist_last2_employee Distance between the treatment year and the second previous job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Dist_last3_employee Distance between the treatment year and the third previous job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Dist_last4_employee Distance between the treatment year and the fourth previous job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sick_leave Number of weeks in sick leave corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_weeks_paid Number of paid weeks corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_fix_term Equal to 1 if the person is in a permanent contract during the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_jtenure Number of years under the same employer up until the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_awork_north Area of work (north) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_awork_center Area of work (center) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_awork_south&Isl. Area of work (south or islands) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_awork_abroad Area of work (abroad) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_apprentice Job qualification (apprentice) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_bluecollar Job qualification (blue-collar) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_whitecollar Job qualification (white-collar) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_manager Job qualification (manager) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_director Job qualification (director) of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_firm_015 Firm dimension (between 0 and 15 employees) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_firm_16250 Firm dimension (between 16 and 250 employees) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_firm_250 Firm dimension (more than 250 employees) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_agriculture Sector of activity (agriculture) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_manufac Sector of activity (manufacturing) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_construc Sector of activity (construction) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_extraction Sector of activity (mineral extraction) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_energy Sector of activity (energy) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_trade Sector of activity (trade) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_foodservices Sector of activity (food and hotel services) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_transports Sector of activity (transports) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_finance Sector of activity (finance services) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_sec_realestate Sector of activity (real estate services) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last_public Sector of activity (public services) corresponding to the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
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(continue)
Variable Name Description
Lagged outcomes
Last1_lab_income Annual earnings of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last2_lab_income Annual earnings of the second previous job as employee as if (t¯-2)
Last3_lab_income Annual earnings of the third previous job as employee as if (t¯-3)
Last4_lab_income Annual earnings of the fourth previous job as employee as if (t¯-4)
Last1_hwage Hourly wage of the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last2_hwage Hourly wage of the second previous job as employee as if (t¯-2)
Last3_hwage Hourly wage of the third previous job as employee as if (t¯-3)
Last4_hwage Hourly wage of the fourth previous job as employee as if (t¯-4)
Last1_fulltime Equal to 1 if the person is full-time employed in the last job as employee as if (t¯-1)
Last2_fulltime Equal to 1 if the person is full-time employed in the second previous job as employee as if (t¯-2)
Last3_fulltime Equal to 1 if the person is full-time employed in the third previous job as employee as if (t¯-3)
Last4_fulltime Equal to 1 if the person is full-time employed in the fourth previous job as employee as if (t¯-4)
Last1_LMP Equal to 1 if the person is an employee, self-employed or an atypical worker in t¯-1
Last2_LMP Equal to 1 if the person is an employee, self-employed or an atypical worker in t¯-2
Last3_LMP Equal to 1 if the person is an employee, self-employed or an atypical worker in t¯-3
Last4_LMP Equal to 1 if the person is an employee, self-employed or an atypical worker in t¯-4
3.3 Implementation
Before any compositional adjustment, the distribution of characteristics varies remark-
ably between treated and control individuals (visible in Table 2, first and second columns), revealing
selection in experiencing CVD shocks. Individuals who experience an acute CVD shock are on
average older, with poorer previous health outcomes (e.g. more frequent previous hospitalisations
and for longer periods, higher receipt of invalidity benefits and sickness leave take-up etc.) and
significant differences in labour market outcomes, possibly related to their different age distribution,
with respect to control individuals. In the spirit of Ho et al. (2007), we compute ATTs combin-
ing preprocessing procedures, aimed at balancing the distribution of covariates between treated and
control individuals over a common support, with parametric estimation on the preprocessed samples
(via OLS and Probit for continuous and binary outcomes respectively), thus obtaining ATTs that
are robust to model misspecification24.
24This two-step approach is regarded as doubly robust as consistency only requires that either the parametric or the non-
parametric component is consistently estimated (Ho et al., 2007).
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Table 2: Pre and post matching covariates balance
Pre-matching Post-matching
Mean Mean
Treated Controls %bias p-value Treated Controls %bias p-value
(1629) (769174 obs.) (1596) (294862 obs.)
Year 2004 2004 1.7 0.503 2004 2004 0.0 1.000
Age 50.73 39.77 127.9 0.000 50.68 50.68 0.0 0.998
Abirth_north 0.271 0.359 23.4 0.000 0.273 0.273 0.0 1.000
Abirth_center 0.142 0.133 2.6 0.284 0.142 0.142 0.0 1.000
Abirth_south&Isl. 0.508 0.354 31.3 0.000 0.507 0.507 0.0 1.000
Abirth_abroad 0.079 0.154 -23.4 0.000 0.078 0.078 0.0 1.000
Country_underdev 0.073 0.139 -21.5 0.000 0.072 0.072 0.0 1.000
Hosp_cvd_cum 0.037 0.001 26.6 0.000 0.024 0.024 0.0 1.000
Days_cvd_cum 0.409 0.012 19.3 0.000 0.282 0.282 0.0 1.000
Hosp_other_cum 0.311 0.190 28.2 0.000 0.308 0.308 0.0 1.000
Days_other_cum 2.814 1.303 22.3 0.000 2.766 2.766 0.0 1.000
Hosp_other_(t¯-1) 0.207 0.096 21.6 0.000 0.204 0.204 0.0 1.000
Days_other_(t¯-1) 0.993 0.440 14.7 0.000 0.979 0.979 0.0 1.000
Inv_benefit_cum 0.077 0.007 35.5 0.000 0.068 0.068 0.0 1.000
Sick_leave_cum 19.28 10.70 38.9 0.000 19.10 19.10 0.0 0.999
Work_active_cum 12.37 10.99 43.0 0.000 12.41 12.41 0.0 0.998
Nemployee_cum 14.23 13.2 25.2 0.000 14.27 14.27 0.0 0.999
Rate_employee_cum 97.01 97.90 -8.9 0.000 96.98 96.98 0.0 1.000
Jobloss_cum 0.312 0.324 -1.8 0.476 0.315 0.315 0.0 1.000
New_firm_cum 2.843 2.937 -3.7 0.120 2.847 2.847 0.0 1.000
Nblue_collar_cum 12.78 10.84 43.8 0.000 12.82 12.82 0.0 0.998
Nwhite_collar_cum 0.281 0.261 1.5 0.523 0.271 0.271 0.0 0.999
Nmanager_cum 0.001 0.002 -1.0 0.753 0.001 0.001 0.0 0.992
Rate_perm_cum 94.88 89.86 28.1 0.000 95.11 95.11 0.0 0.998
Rate_fullt_cum 96.39 96.55 -1.1 0.636 96.64 96.64 0.0 1.000
Ever_CIG 0.384 0.335 10.2 0.000 0.385 0.385 0.0 0.999
Nunempl_cum 0.393 0.381 1.1 0.646 0.384 0.384 0.0 1.000
Unempl_(t¯-1) 0.039 0.059 -9.5 0.000 0.039 0.039 0.0 0.999
Rate_selfempl_cum 3.699 2.596 9.1 0.000 3.749 3.748 0.0 1.000
Days_self_cum 165.5 130.6 5.9 0.013 168.4 168.4 0.0 1.000
Rate_atypical_cum 0.403 0.632 -6.1 0.030 0.374 0.374 0.0 1.000
N_atypical_cum 0.050 0.062 -2.6 0.307 0.046 0.046 0.0 1.000
Dist_last1_employee 1.044 1.056 -3.3 0.205 1.036 1.036 0.0 1.000
Dist_last2_employee 2.141 2.153 -1.4 0.580 2.130 2.130 0.0 1.000
Dist_last3_employee 3.261 3.267 -0.6 0.816 3.249 3.249 0.0 1.000
Dist_last4_employee 4.391 4.413 -1.6 0.536 4.375 4.375 0.0 1.000
Last_sick_leave 2.202 1.156 23.4 0.000 2.167 2.167 0.0 1.000
Last_weeks_paid 47.57 45.95 14.5 0.000 47.65 47.65 0.0 0.999
Last_fix_term 0.041 0.081 -16.9 0.000 0.036 0.036 0.0 0.997
Last_jtenure 8.911 6.621 34.9 0.000 8.952 8.952 0.0 0.999
Last_awork_north 0.484 0.568 -16.8 0.000 0.482 0.482 0.0 1.000
Last_awork_center 0.179 0.176 0.8 0.735 0.182 0.182 -0.0 1.000
Last_awork_south&Isl. 0.336 0.256 17.8 0.000 0.336 0.336 0.0 1.000
Last_awork_abroad 0 0.002 -2.2 0.539 0 0 . .
Last_apprentice 0.001 0.017 -17.3 0.000 0 3.6e(−05) -0.2 0.810
Last_bluecollar 0.994 0.976 15.3 0.000 0.996 0.996 0.1 0.986
Last_whitecollar 0.005 0.007 -3.1 0.247 0.004 0.004 0.0 1.000
Last_manager 0 6.0e(−05) -1.1 0.755 0 3.3e(−06) -0.1 0.942
Last_director 0 3.1e(−05) -0.8 0.822 0 1.1e(−06) 0.0 0.966
Last_firm_015 0.297 0.368 -15.2 0.000 0.298 0.298 0.0 0.999
Last_firm16250 0.431 0.414 3.4 0.175 0.431 0.431 0.0 1.000
Last_firm_250 0.273 0.218 12.8 0.000 0.271 0.271 0.0 1.000
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(continue)
Pre-matching Post-matching
Mean Mean
Treated Controls %bias p-value Treated Controls %bias p-value
(1629) (769174 obs.) (1596) (294862 obs.)
Last_sec_agriculture 0.001 0.0004 1.1 0.626 0.001 0.001 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_manufac 0.416 0.493 -15.5 0.000 0.420 0.420 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_construc 0.169 0.172 -0.7 0.784 0.170 0.170 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_extraction 0.008 0.005 3.4 0.128 0.008 0.008 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_energy 0.018 0.011 6.0 0.006 0.019 0.019 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_trade 0.069 0.101 -11.5 0.000 0.068 0.068 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_foodservices 0.043 0.046 -1.6 0.531 0.043 0.043 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_transports 0.144 0.088 17.6 0.000 0.143 0.143 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_finance 0.123 0.076 15.7 0.000 0.119 0.119 0.0 1.000
Last_sec_realestate 0.006 0.003 3.8 0.069 0.006 0.006 0.0 1.000
Last_public 0.004 0.005 -1.7 0.516 0.003 0.003 0.0 1.000
Last1_lab_income 22310 20835 14.1 0.000 22429 22429 0.0 1.000
Last2_lab_income 21822 20344 14.1 0.000 21922 21922 0.0 1.000
Last3_lab_income 21491 19851 15.0 0.000 21620 21619 0.0 0.999
Last4_lab_income 21222 19002 20.2 0.000 21337 21337 0.0 1.000
Last1_hwage 11.83 11.34 9.2 0.002 11.85 11.85 0.0 1.000
Last2_hwage 11.69 11.14 9.9 0.001 11.72 11.72 0.0 1.000
Last3_hwage 11.65 10.98 9.0 0.005 11.67 11.67 0.0 1.000
Last4_hwage 11.56 10.82 6.9 0.044 11.61 11.61 0.0 1.000
Last1_fulltime 0.950 0.962 -6.0 0.009 0.956 0.956 0.0 1.000
Last2_fulltime 0.952 0.965 -6.7 0.004 0.956 0.956 0.0 1.000
Last3_fulltime 0.956 0.965 -4.7 0.046 0.961 0.961 0.0 1.000
Last4_fulltime 0.956 0.965 -4.3 0.069 0.960 0.960 0.0 1.000
Last1_LMP 0.981 0.976 3.2 0.219 0.984 0.984 0.0 0.999
Last2_LMP 0.964 0.964 0.0 0.985 0.966 0.966 0.0 1.000
Last3_LMP 0.949 0.953 -1.7 0.495 0.950 0.950 0.0 1.000
Last4_LMP 0.934 0.936 -0.8 0.746 0.937 0.937 0.0 1.000
Following Jones et al. (2019), the distributional adjustments are implemented in two
steps: coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus et al., 2011) along a set of basic confounders, and
entropy balancing matching (EB) (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller and Xu, 2013) on the full set
of observed potential confounders. CEM performs an exact matching between treated and control
individuals based on coarsened variables values. The advantage, with respect to other matching
procedures, is that CEM reduces the imbalance in selected variables, while implementing common
support on these, without affecting the balancing in other variables (as other procedures, such as
propensity score matching, might instead entail, trading-off the balance obtainable for different
variables), while also accounting for variables’ interactions and nonlinearities. In practice, the CEM
algorithm stratifies the sample by subsets of coarsened variables values (or exact variable values, in
the case of dichotomous variables, or if no coarsening is applied) of selected variables. Individuals
falling in strata lacking at least one treated and one control are dropped, while retained individuals
are attributed a weight accounting for the different number of treated and control individuals retained
in each matched stratum. The greater the number of variables involved, and the finer the coarsening
applied to non-dichotomous variables, the higher the loss of cases for which no exact matching is
found.
We implement CEM on uncoarsened variable values, which results in an exact matching
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on: age, year, the distance (in years) from the previous time the individual was observed as em-
ployee25, whether the individual had a past experience of acute CVD shock26, whether working in
a part-time or full-time contract, and whether under a fixed-term or open-ended contract as of t¯-1.
Two further variables included are instead coarsened: firm size (0-15/16-250/250+ employees) as of
t¯-1; and region of work, coarsened to a geographical area indicator (north-east, north-west, centre,
south and islands). Job-specific variables are included as of t¯-1, rather than as of the year of shock
occurrence, to avoid the chance of introducing post-treatment bias, which would arise if they were
themselves affected by the shock, a possibility that we cannot rule out for year t¯. It is worth noting
though that in the 89% of treated cases and the 88% of control cases, the employer does not change
between t¯-1 and t¯.
Out of the 17,349 strata obtained, only 961 are retained. However, this corresponds to
a loss of only 33 treated individuals, paired with a striking reduction in the number of control
individuals (about the 60%). The ratio of #potential control/#treated individuals is reduced from
472 controls for every treated pre-CEM to 185 controls for every treated post-CEM (Table A2 in
Appendix). To remove imbalances remaining in the larger set of potential confounders observed, we
further apply EB matching on the CEM-retained samples of treated and control individuals. The EB
procedure reweights observations so that the covariate distributions satisfy a set of specified moment
conditions (Hainmueller et al., 2012), imposing ex-ante a desired level of sample moment adjustment.
We impose, as usually chosen, a first moment condition on the extended set of variables, obtaining
a remarkable overlap, as visible in the right panel of Table 2 (and Table A.3 in Appendix for further
moments). In the preprocessed samples, the bias, measured as standardised percentage difference
in means between treated and matched controls, is strikingly reduced to zero for all variables, with
a few exceptions, where it anyway does not exceed a -0.2.
Indeed, lack of bias in observables does not address the chance of potential remaining
bias stemming from unobservables, in particular time- varying unobservables (as potential bias from
the time invariant ones is tackled through the inclusion of lagged outcomes), which would invalidate
our identification strategy. However, while we cannot entirely rule out the chance of this particular
source of bias, it is reassuring to observe in Figure 2 the post-preprocessing sample means for each
labour outcome Y 1i,t and Y
0
i,t, over the years before the shock for the treated and matched controls.
If time-varying unobservable were actually playing a role as confounders, that would presumably
emerge in detectable differences in pre-shock outcomes between treated and successfully matched
controls. Instead, no such difference is detectable in the four years before t¯, i.e. the year of shock
occurrence. On the contrary, average outcomes for the two groups diverge since t¯+1 in terms of
employment and probability of full-time work; or even since t¯ in the case of annual employment
25In the 97.9% of cases, this corresponds to the previous year. For the other, including this variables allows then comparing
individuals with lagged outcomes referable to the same past calendar year.
26Which would be captured in the available SDO data, i.e. since 2001.
18
income and hourly wages, signalling an immediate adjustment in the first months past the shock27.
We finally proceed by estimating parametric models (OLS and probit according to the
continuous or binary nature of outcome), to obtain the ATTs (measured by coefficients and marginal
effects for the treatment indicator respectively) reported in the following results section28. With
respect to taking a simple difference in outcomes sample means on the post-preprocessing treated
and control samples (anyway visible in Figure 2 for each outcome, for the shock year t¯ and the
following years), the parametric estimation controls for any possibly remaining imbalance in the
larger set of all included covariates’ distribution.
Figure 2: Sample means for labour outcomes, by treatment status, after CEM and EB adjustments
Source: WHIP&HEALTH. Notes: Control group sample means are computed on successfully matched controls only.
Continuous lines connect time-specific sample means.
27In Figure 2, continuous lines connect time-specific sample means. It would be incorrect though to interpret figures on
earnings and wages as revealing a drop in outcomes for the treated since before the shock occurs; the apparent drop rather
results from the treated outcome means in t¯ , which averages months before and months after the shock occurrence, being lower
than in t¯-1.
28The following regression model has been applied:
Yt¯+ν = α0 + α1Ti,t¯ + β
′
1Wi + β
′
2Xi,t¯−s + i,t¯
where ν goes from 1 to 7 (up to 9 in the longer term analysis), Ti,t¯ is a dummy variable representing the treatment group,Wi
indicates the individual time-invariant characteristics, while Xi,t¯−s includes time-varying labour, social insurance and health
histories variables, observed s years before the shock.
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4 Results
4.1 Labour market outcomes
Table 3 reports the estimated ATTs (τt¯+ν) for the probability of employment (i.e. working
as an employee) and unconditional annual income from employment, together with the relative
size effect, computed as the percentage ratio of each ATT τt¯+ν to the mean of the corresponding
counterfactual outcome Y 0i,t¯+ν in matched controls sample. Estimated ATTs and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals on these outcomes are also depicted in Figures 3-4.
Table 3: Employment-related unconditional outcome: ATT and Relative Effect
Probability of Employment Annual income from employment
Time τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
t¯ - - -693.2*** -3.17
Rob. SE. - - (202.4)
N .treated - - 1.594
t¯ +1 -0.030*** -3.35 -2540.4*** -12.8
Rob. SE. (0.009) (278.7)
N. treated 1596 1.596
t¯+2 -0.085*** -10.41 -2584.9*** -14.11
Rob. SE. (0.011) (303.8)
N. treated 1596 1.596
t¯+3 -0.093*** -12.59 -2337.4*** -13.9
Rob. SE. (0.011) (311.6)
N. treated 1596 1.596
t¯+4 -0.076*** -11.38 -2195.9*** -14.4
Rob. SE. (0.012) (317.5)
N. treated 1596 1.596
t¯+5 -0.080*** -13.17 -2229.7*** -16.4
Rob. SE. (0.012) (310.3)
N. treated 1596 1.596
t¯+6 -0.078*** -13.90 -1761.6*** -14.5
Rob. SE. (0.000) (305.5)
N. treated 1596 1.596
t¯+7 -0.068*** -13.60 -1665.6*** -12.9
Rob. SE. (0.011) (291.6)
N. treated 1596 1.596
Source: WHIP&Health
Notes: marginal effects are reported for the Probability of employment (ATTs); by sample selection all individuals are employed
in t¯, thus the probability of employment in that year is 1 by construction.
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Figure 3: ATTs by year since CVD hospitalization: employment and labour market activity
Source: WHIP&Health. Notes: ATTs: point estimates (connected lines) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines);
marginal effects are reported; by sample selection all individuals are employed in the year of the shock, thus the ATT
is set to 0 in that year
In the Italian institutional setting, experiencing a CVD shock entails a remarkable re-
duction in blue-collar workers’ employment probability, a results which is line with previous studies
conducted in other countries29. Here, the employment probability reduction amounts to about -3
percentage points in the year immediately after the shock, but increases, and persists, over the fol-
lowing years. Actually, loss of employment peaks three years after the shock, reaching -9.3 percentage
points, and displays only a very minor recovery thereafter. Seven years later, the consequence of
having experienced a CVD shock amounts to a -6.8 percentage points lower probability of employ-
ment, thus reaching in the longer term a value that is almost twice the short-term (i.e. t¯+1) effect. It
is worth emphasising how, in terms of relative size effect, i.e. w.r.t. the average counterfactual out-
come, the size of employment probability reduction exceeds 10 per cent from t¯+2 onwards, reaching
13 per cent in t¯+7.
In line with the majority of previous literature, loss of employment bears a substantial
and immediate (i.e. since the shock year) loss of income from employment. But also, our longer-term
analysis reveals how persistent this loss is, amounting, in any of the seven years past the shock, to
more than 12 per cent of the earnings those blue collars would have obtained in the absence of the
shock, up to a relative effect of about 13% in t¯+7. The peak in earnings loss arises in the very short
term (i.e. t¯+1), plausibly in relation to the take-up of sickness leave, which is only partially covered
29Note that a potential threat for our findings may arise due to selective mortality. The estimated ATT for the probability of
employment and of labor market activity might be potentially biased upward if the probability to die is higher among the treated
than among the controls. Remember that we are not in the condition to identify exits due to death. In the introduction, we
outlined that CVD are among the leading causes of death in developed countries, including Italy. A sizeable quota - amounting
to 30-40% - of fatal events in the age range 35-64 occur right after the symptoms start and before reaching the hospital (Ministry
of Health, 2010). Furthermore, we are able to select into the analysis survivors after the period of hospitalisation. The Italian
Ministry of Health (2017) reports that the 30-days mortality rate for myocardial infarctions is equal to 8.3%, while the 1-
year mortality is equal to 10.2%, only 1.9 percent higher. This means that after the first month from the health shock, the
probability to die is rather low. Based on these data and considerations, we believe that the mortality-based selectivity issue
does not sizeably bias our findings.
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by the employer (the remaining replacement being granted trough public transfers).
Table 4: Labour activity and transition to self-employment/atypical work: ATT and Relative Effects
Probability of Probability of working
labour market activity as self-employed/atypical worker
Time τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
t¯ - - - -
Rob. SE - - - -
N. treated - - - -
t¯+ 1 -0.036*** -4.02 -0.009*** -45.48
Rob. SE (0.009) (0.002)
N. treated 1.596 1.596
t¯+ 2 -0.087*** -10.5 -0.002 -8.14
Rob. SE (0.011) (0.004)
N. treated 1.596 1.596
t¯+ 3 -0.095*** -12.5 -0.003 -11.40
Rob. SE (0.011) (0.004)
N. treated 1.596 1.596
t¯+ 4 -0.078*** -11.3 -0.003 -9.20
Rob. SE (0.011) (0.004)
N. treated 1.596 1.596
t¯+ 5 -0.078*** -12.3 -0.002 -6.97
Rob. SE (0.012) (0.004)
N. treated 1.596 1.596
t¯+ 6 -0.078*** -13.5 -0.005 -13.83
Rob. SE (0.011) (0.004)
N. treated 1.596 1.596
t¯+ 7 -0.068*** -12.9 -0.002 -6.38
Rob. SE (0.011) (0.004)
N. treated 1.596 1.596
Source: WHIP&Health
Notes: marginal effects are reported for the Probability of labour market activity and for the Probability of working as self-
employed/atypical worker (ATTs); by sample selection all individuals are employed in t¯, thus the probability of labour market
activity in that year is 1 by construction, and for the same reason the probability of working as self-employment/atypical work
is 0.
In Table 4, we consider a wider concept of labour market activity, which includes, beside
employment, possible transitions to other forms of labour supply, i.e. self-employment or atypical
work. In the year after the shock, the size of the negative ATT for labour market activity (Table
4, first column) is even larger than for employment (Table 3, first column), which is explained by a
shock-induced reduction in the probability of switching from employment to other forms of labour,
at least in the short term (Table 4, right-hand panel). This finding might appear at odds with
the argument that individuals might be "pushed" into self-employment by lack of opportunities or
perspectives as employees (see e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). In this literature, some studies
identify health-related limitations to work ability as a main driver of switches to self-employment;
and a higher quota of disable persons among the self-employed, better able to accommodate their own
condition (see, e.g., Zissimopoulos and Karoly, 2005). However, in the Italian institutional context,
our finding can be plausibly explained by the short-run health-related protection granted under
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employment (i.e. sickness leave paid for six months, allowing to stop working while maintaining
the contract, and the option to resume that work later on). Such employment-related protection
plausibly lowers the incentive to switch to other forms of work, which, although possibly more
flexible, grant lower income protection. In the following years though, the ATTs on employment
and labour market activity are roughly comparable in size, consistently with the evidence of no
significant response in the probability of switching to self-employment or atypical work from t¯+2
onwards.
Figure 4: ATTs by year since CVD hospitalization: (unconditional) annual income from employment
Source: WHIP&Health. Notes: ATTs: point estimates (connected line) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines).
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Table 5: Conditional employment-related outcomes: ATT and Relative Effect
Annual income Probability to be Hourly wage Probability of working
from employment employed full-time with the same employer as in t¯
Time τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
t¯ -693.2*** -3.17 0.003 0.32 -0.295*** -2.48 - -
Rob. SE. (202.4) (0.005) (0.099) - - -
N. Treated 1,594 1,594 1,594 - - -
t¯+1 -2138.1*** -9.50 -0.007 -0.74 -0.551*** -4.52 0.019** 2.18
Rob. SE. (255.6) (0.006) (0.119) (0.008)
N. Treated 1.349 1.349 1349 1361
t¯+2 -1081.9*** -4.76 -0.015** -1.59 -0.297** -2.41 0.004 0.49
Rob. SE. (273.9) (0.007) (0.116) (0.015)
N. Treated 1.144 1.144 1.144 1152
t¯+3 -606.8** -2.64 -0.011 -1.17 -0.198 -1.58 -0.014 1.96
Rob. SE. (283.5) (0.008) (0.129) (0.014)
N. Treated 1.020 1.020 1.020 1031
t¯+4 -860.4** -3.75 -0.017* -1.83 -0.274** -2.18 -0.022 -3.43
Rob. SE. (322.1) (0.009) (0.124) (0.015)
N. Treated 932 932 932 945
t¯+5 -983.3*** -4.33 -0.016* -1.74 -0.281* -2.24 0.003 0.48
Rob. SE. (345.5) (0.010) (0.146) (0.016)
N. Treated 826 826 826 840
t¯+6 -528.6 -2.35 -0.007 -0.77 -0.356** -2.83 -0.008 -1.50
Rob. SE. (362.7) (0.011) (0.145) (0.017)
N. Treated 749 749 749 756
t¯+7 -742.6* -3.35 -0.005 -0.56 -0.323** -2.59 -0.001 -0.23
Rob. SE. (348.9) (0.012) (0.158) (0.018)
N. Treated 675 675 675 685
Source: WHIP&Health
Notes: marginal effects are reported for the Probability to be employed full-time and for the Probability of working with the
same employer as in t¯ (ATTs); the probability of working with the same employer in that year is 1 by construction.
Table 5 and Figures 5 to 8 report the estimated ATTs (and corresponding relative size
effects) for outcomes observed conditionally on remaining in employment: in more detail, we consider
annual income from employment, the probability to be employed full- (versus part-) time, hourly
wage30 and the probability of working with the same employer as in t¯ (the year of the shock).
The blue-collar workers that continue employment after a CVD shock still bear a significant loss
in earnings, again with a peak in t¯+1 plausibly related to the take-up of sickness leave. In relative
terms, the loss amounts to about -9 per cent in the first year; later, while reduced in size (up to
-3% in t¯+7), it remains significant throughout the longer run (see also Figure 5). Clearly, exit from
employment explains the quantitative difference observable between the relative effect measured on
unconditional (Table 3) and conditional (Table 5) earnings. Further columns in Table 5 contribute
to shed some light on the possible channels explaining why a reduction in earnings might occur
despite remaining employed. First, we consider the possibility of an adjustment in working times.
The probability of switching from full- to part-time is substantially unaltered (see also Figure 6)
with respect to what would have happened in the absence of the CVD shock. In a few years only
30We compute hourly wages combining information on labour income, paid weeks and the working time (part-time or full-
time). We do not observe the number of hours worked in the WHIP data. However, we do recover the distribution of hours
worked for male blue-collar workers from the EU-QLFS data. We do find that this distribution is highly concentrated around
two mass points: 20 hours for part timers and 40 hours for full time workers (with no dispersion in the latter case, consistently
with legal provisions). When computing the hourly wage, we attribute 20 hours of work to part time contracts and 40 hours to
full time contracts. It is worth noticing that 94,34% of all annual prevalent contracts in our data are full-time.
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(t¯+2,t¯+4,t¯+5) the ATT of full- (versus part-) time employment is significant and negative, yet pretty
small in size: the relative effect in those years does not exceeds the two percentage points.
Figure 5: ATTs by year since CVD hospitalisation: (conditional) annual income from employment
Source: WHIP&Health. Notes: ATTs: point estimates (connected line) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines)
Figure 6: ATTs by year since CVD hospitalisation: probability of full- (versus part-) time
Source: WHIP&Health. Notes: ATTs: point estimates (connected lines) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines);
marginal effects are reported.
Second, we investigate hourly wage adjustments (see also Figure 7). Hourly wage shows
negative and significant ATTs. In relative terms, the magnitude is low, ranging from less than 2%
to 4% in the first year past the shock. The later wage dynamics observed for individuals in the
treatment and control groups reveal, consistently with a downward wage rigidity scenario, that the
negative effect is mostly to be traced to a lower nominal growth experienced by individuals’ hit by
the CVD shock, with respect to matched controls.
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Figure 7: ATTs by year since CVD hospitalisation: hourly wage
Source: WHIP&HEALTH. Notes: ATTs: point estimates (connected line) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines).
A further mechanism through which labour income losses might occur entails transitions to
other jobs (with a different employer), motivated by the search for tasks more suited to accommodate
disability, acceptable even under a lower pay. Interestingly, the probability of working with the same
employer as at the time of the shock registers a significant, yet small, increase only in t¯+1 (see also
Figure 8). The timing of this increase matches that observed for the reduction in transitions to
self-employment or atypical work (Table 4), and correspond to the time when sickness protection is
being granted under employment. However, in the following years, transitions to other jobs do not
appear as an adjustment channel actually pursued by Italian blue-collar workers.
Figure 8: ATTs by year since CVD hospitalisation: (conditional) probability of working with the same employer as
in t¯
Source: WHIP&HEALTH. Notes: point estimates (connected lines) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines);
marginal effects are reported.
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4.2 The long(er) run
Table 6 reports the relative effects of the probability of employment and unconditional
annual earnings in the (even) longer run, i.e. up to t¯+8 and t¯+9, which can be estimated only
on workers hit by CVD shocks occurred respectively in 2003-2004 and 2003 (corresponding ATTs
are shown in Appendix Table A4). To enhance comparability across results obtained from these
restricted subsamples, in the first two columns we repeat results reported in Table 3, obtained on
the full treatment sample covering also the CVD shocks experienced in 2005.
Exploiting the two subsamples for which long-run outcomes can be observed, columns 3-4
illustrate results extended up to t¯+8, while columns 5-6 reports results extended up to t¯+9. Notice
that only in the latter case a one-to-one relationship between distance from the shock and calendar
year can be established: in more detail, t¯+8 corresponds to the calendar year 2011 and t¯+9 to the
calendar year 2012. Overall, results highlight the long-term effect persistence for both outcomes.
It is interesting to note how the effects in t¯+9 deviate somehow from those registered
in previous years/periods: the relative reduction in employment probability jumps to -22% (from
a value of -14% in 2011). Similarly, annual earnings suddenly drop, in relative size effect terms,
from -22% to -29%. While we cannot entirely rule out the chance of effect dynamics specific to the
ninth year past the shock, the 2012 evidence nicely fits the important legislated changes outlined in
section 2, namely the Monti-Fornero reform of labour law (and partly the September 2011 Berlusconi
reform) which significantly reduced firing restrictions in medium and large firms.
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4.3 Heterogeneity: age, CVD shock type, firm size
In this section, we explore effect heterogeneity along three dimensions: workers’ age, type
of CVD shock, and firm dimension. A priori, age might be expected to affect findings, both in
terms of size and time trend. Older individuals might be less attached to the labour market in the
light of their higher chances of exploiting available routes of permanent exit from the labour market,
such as early-retirement or disability pensions. Besides, in a model of health capital formation,
investments in health-specific human capital fostering labour recovery may be more attractive for
by that younger individuals, given expected earnings-related returns over a longer time horizon
(Charles, 2003). Table 7 reports results for employment and unconditional earnings, distinguishing
workers aged 52 (i.e. the median sample age at the time of the shock) or younger, from workers
older than 52. Consistently with previous studies conducted in other countries (see e.g. Jones et
al., 2019) older workers’ shock-induced loss, both in employment and in unconditional earnings,
is substantially higher than younger workers’. In the short term, the relative size effects for older
workers, in both outcomes, is at least twice the one observed for younger workers. A similar age
gradient (i.e. a relative effect for older workers more than doubling that for younger workers) is
visible in Table 8 for conditional outcomes in the short term. In the longer run, apparent gradients
for conditional outcomes are to be interpreted with caution, as reflecting also the higher chances of
previous employment exit suffered by older workers.
Next, in Table 9, we consider the specific type of CVD shock experienced, distinguishing
myocardial infarction from stroke, which often turns out as a more severe condition, possibly leading
to stronger impairment to work31. Indeed, we find stroke to bring about a much stronger reduction
in the probability of employment than myocardial infarction, systematically over time: for instance,
the relative effect in t¯+3 amounts to -21 per cent for the former and -8 per cent for the latter. For
both CVD conditions, the shock-induced loss of employment is persistent over time. Similar findings
are obtained for other labor market outcomes in the short term; again, longer terms gradients on
outcomes measured conditional on being employed will also reflect the higher chances of previous
exit suffered in case of stroke, and for this reason are to be interpreted with caution. Bearing this
limitation in mind, results - presented in Table 10 - for the probability of working full- (versus part-)
time suggest that the small but significant result previously obtained on the full sample (in Table
5) for t¯+4 and t¯+5 is mostly attributable to individuals hit by stroke.
The third type of heterogeneity we investigate, novel in this literature to our knowledge,
concerns firm size just before the shock onset. Firm size is of particular policy interest in the light
of the differing extent of employment protection granted in the country, and related hiring rates
(to give a figure, based on Contini (2009): 50 percent in small firms, declining to a value of 25
31Shock severity has an a priori undefined effect on preference for leisure/work. In fact, a more severe shock may, on the one
hand, increase the value of leisure as a consequence of an expected lowered life expectancy; on the other hand, it may reduce
its value by limiting the possibility of performing or enjoying leisure activities.
29
percent for firms with more than 200 employees). Also, because organisational practices fostering
disabled workers’ inclusion, for example workplace training, disability accommodation, reallocation
to different tasks or branches, increase with firm size (see e.g. Bassanini et al., 2007). Table 11
shows ATTs for employment probability and unconditional earnings, distinguishing firms with a) up
to 15 employees; b) from 16 to 250 employees; c) with more than 250 employees32.The shock-induced
reduction in employment is particularly evident in small firms, with a relative effect increasing over
time from -9.7 per cent in t¯+1 up to -23 per cent in t¯+7. Indeed, firms with up to 15 employees are
those not subject to the Worker’s Statute33, thus bearing a cost, for firing workers under open-ended
contracts, which is much lower than for larger firms34. At the same time, within-firm reallocations
are very difficult to implement in small firms.
The reduction in the employment probability following a CVD shock is systematically
smaller in medium-big firms; even smaller in firms with 250+ employees, where actually no significant
reduction takes place, before two years past the shock. A qualitatively similar gradient emerges when
looking at annual earnings (unconditional, see Table 11; conditional, see Table 12). The ATTs for
the conditional probability of being employed full- (versus part-) time is never significant in small
firms. Results for hourly wage by firm size, reported in Table 13, display a clear negative association
between firm dimension and the size of differential wage adjustment, suggesting that most of the
effect reported in Table 5 for the full sample occurs in smaller firms, featuring larger scope for
firm-level bargaining.
Finally, we report in Appendix (Tables A5 and A6) results obtained from heterogeneity
analyses for labour activity, by the type of contract (open-ended versus fixed-term) and hours worked
(part- versus full-time) just before the shock onset. In both cases, the sample numbers for one
subgroup (fixed-term contracts and part-time contracts respectively) is definitely low, given the
limited sample prevalence of such types, with a consequent possible loss of significance. Bearing this
limitation in mind, results visible in Table A5 are consistent with the lower protection granted to
blue collar workers hired under fixed term contracts, visible since the short run. The fact that, in
Table A6, no significant reduction in labour activity is ever experienced by part-timers, as opposed
to full-timers, appears suggestive of a role for reduced working times in facilitating labour inclusion.
32The sample distribution of firm size emerging from Table 11 (and shown in Table 2) is very different from that reported in
footnote 13, which provides evidence of a very high percentage of micro and small firms. This is because WHIP&Health offers
a sample representative of workers, rather than firms, thus over representing larger firms.
33See section 2, footnote 12.
34The effects of a differential workers’ protection on the probability to exit employment is confirmed when disaggregating the
sample according to the worker’ contract type. Table A5 illustrates that workers with a fixed-term contract have a much higher
probability to exit employment in the short run (i.e. until t+3) than workers with a permanent job. The effect for fixed-term
jobs is so striking to emerge even in a sample of constituted of about 55 observations.
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Table 13: Conditional employment-related outcomes by firm dimension: ATT and Relative Effect
Hourly Wage
0-15 employees 16-250 employees 250+ employees
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
t¯ -0.291* -2.81 -0.256* -2.17 -0.320 -2.31
Rob. SE. (0.148) (0.141) (0.213)
N. treated 475 687 432
t¯+1 -0.699*** -6.57 -0.451** -3.76 -0.631** -4.45
Rob. SE. (0.192) (0.164) (0.247)
N. treated 369 599 381
t¯+2 -0.731*** -6.80 -0.104 -0.86 -0.259 -1.81
Rob. SE. (0.181) (0.156) (0.237)
N. treated 312 508 324
t¯+3 -0.343 -3.13 -0.242 -1.96 -0.164 -1.13
Rob. SE. (0.208) (0.169) (0.273)
N. treated 282 456 282
t¯+4 -0.463** -4.23 -0.354** -2.85 -0.115 -0.79
Rob. SE. (0.175) (0.171) (0.260)
N. treated 263 420 249
t¯+5 -0.292 -2.66 -0.474** -3.81 -0.092 -0.63
Rob. SE. (0.238) (0.193) (0.310)
N. treated 232 370 224
t¯+6 -0.768*** -6.98 -0.394** -3.16 -0.101 -0.69
Rob. SE. (0.200) (0.195) (0.318)
N. treated 204 346 199
t¯+7 -0.635*** -5.80 -0.474** -3.80 0.178 1.24
Rob. SE. (0.197) (0.205) (0.395)
N. treated 185 321 169
Source: WHIP&Health
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5 Discussion and Conclusions
The findings reported in the previous sections offer a novel representation of the long-term
consequences of acute CVD shocks in a highly regulated labour market, featuring strong downward
wage rigidity. In the Italian case, the onset of acute health conditions suffered by blue-collar workers
results in frictions that find little scope for adjustment along the hours or wage margins. The
bulk of response emerges instead along the extensive margin, in terms of a sizeable and persistent
employment loss. It is important to stress how employment exit happens in a setting where low
hiring rates hamper later return to work. Indeed, among those who leave employment within the
first year past the shock, we observe only the 16 per cent to resume employment within the following
three years. Relatedly, transitions to possibly less demanding jobs do not generally offer a viable
route of adjustment in the medium to long-term, suggesting that employment exit might likely
become an absorbing state. Indeed, our long-term analysis has clarified that loss of employment
persists for at least nine years past the health shock, and presumably thereafter.
Should we be concerned about the consequences? On the one hand, loss of employment
entails a loss of market earnings. Arguably, in Italy, a relatively generous social insurance system
compensates such earnings loss: substantial renewable or permanent disability-related transfers are
granted to workers satisfying mild contributory conditions. Yet, in the face of such protection, there
are further losses entailed. Besides the fiscal cost of the public transfer programmes used to replace
market earnings, losing employment means losing social inclusion opportunities. Several studies in
psychology have related work activity to wellbeing through self-esteem, motivation, sense of purpose,
and social interactions (e.g. Spelten et al., 2002; Hackett et al., 2012; Vestling et al., 2013), while
clinical studies use return to work as indicative of recovery after a major health shock (Daniel et al.,
2009; Trygged et al., 2011).
In practice, remaining at work might actually be problematic for individuals experien-
cing severe health deteriorations, particularly if they cannot reduce working times, not even when
prepared to accept a remuneration adjustment reflecting lower productivity. In this respect, a first
policy recommendation, viable even in the short-term, would be providing public incentives for firms
to agree on voluntary (on the employee side) part-time work, as a way to reconcile working activity
with health related limitations (Devicienti et al., 2015). Currently, in the country, firms rather avoid
offering part-time options, because entailing lower productivity (e.g. in relation to the fixed cost of
hiring each worker) and ultimately higher costs, in a setting where there is no chance of compens-
ating them through wage adjustments (Devicienti et al., 2015). Acting on the wage mobility side
appears a less viable option, at least in the short term, given the extensive role played by collective
bargaining in the country.
The evidence we offer is subject to several potential limitations. To begin with, it con-
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cerns only a segment of the labour force, i.e. blue-collar workers, although the one presumably more
exposed to the risk of experiencing work-ability limitations as generally employed in more physically
demanding tasks. Second, it only concerns individuals hit by acute CVD conditions, while also sev-
eral other types of health deteriorations might affect workers. Moreover, while using administrative
data presents major advantages, it also entails drawbacks. The limited coverage of relevant topic
areas has hampered the scope for further heterogeneity analyses, and limited the range of observed
confounders we could exploit for identification. Last, but not least, lack of information on later
mortality implies exposure to bias possibly stemming from selective mortality.
Bearing these limitations in mind, the novel evidence produced, for the labour effects
of health shocks over the longer term in a highly regulated institutional setting, will hopefully
contribute to inform policy design on the timely and challenging issue of disabled workers’ social
inclusion.
39
References
[1] Au, D. W. H. Crossley, T. F. Schellhorn, M. (2005). The effect of health changes and long-
term health on the work activity of older Canadians Health Economics. Quantitative Studies in
Economics and Population Research Reports 397, McMaster University.
[2] Arpaia, A. and Mourre, G. ( 2012). Institutions and performance in European labor markets:
taking a fresh look at the evidence. Journal of Economic Surveys 26: 1? 41.
[3] Baker, M., Stabile, M., Deri, C. (2004). What Do Self-Reported, Objective, Measures of Health
Measure?, Journal of Human Resources, 39(4): 1067-1093.
[4] Bassanini A, Booth A, Brunello G, De Paola M, Leuven E (2007). Workplace training in Europe.
In: Brunello G, Garibaldi P, Wasmer E (eds) Education and training in Europe. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, pp 8?13
[5] Becker G.S. (1964). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Refer-
ence to Education. (3rd Edition), NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc,
number beck94-1.
[6] Benitez-Silva, H., Buchinsky, M., Man Chan, H., Cheidvasser, S. , Rust, J. (2004). How large is
the bias in self reported disability?, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19(4): 649-670.
[7] Berton F., Richiardi, M., Sacchi S. (2012). The Political Economy of Work Security And Flex-
ibility: Italy In Comparative Perspective. The Policy Press, University of Bristol.
[8] Blanchflower, D.G., Oswald, A.J. (1998). What makes an entrepreneur? Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 16 (1), 26?60.
[9] Bradley, C.J., D. Neumark, H.L., Barkowski, S. (2013). Does employer provided health insurance
contraint labour supply adjustments to health shocks? New evidence on women diagnosed with
Breast cancer. Journal of Health Economics, 32(5): 833-849.
[10] Braunwald, E., Mann, D. L., Zipes, D. P., Libby, P., Bonow, R. O. (2015). Braunwald’s heart
disease: a textbook of cardiovascular medicine. Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier/Saunders.
[11] Cai, L. (2010). The relationship between health and labour force participation: Evidence from
a panel data simultaneous equation model. Labour Economics, 17(1): 77-90.
[12] Cai, L., Mavromaras, K. Oguzoglu, U. (2014). The effects of Health and Health Shocks on
Hours Worked. Health Economics, 23(5): 516-528.
[13] Charles, K. (2003). The longitudinal structure of earnings losses among work-limited disabled
workers. Journal of Human Resources. 38 (3), 618-646.
40
[14] Coile, C. (2004). Health Shocks and Couples’ Labour Supply Decisions. NBER Working Paper
No. 10810.
[15] Contini, B. (2019), Dai "lavori usa e getta" al Jobs Act. Aracne editrice, Roma.
[16] Currie, J., Madrian, B.C. (1999). Health, Health Insurance and the Labor Market, in Hand-
book of Labor Economics vol. 3C, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, 3309-3416. New York:
Elsevier Science.
[17] Daniel, K., Wolfe, C.D., Busch, M.A., McKevitt, C., (2009) What are the social consequences
of stroke for working-aged adults? A systematic review Stroke 6, 431-40.
[18] Dano, A. M. (2005). Road injuries and long-run effects on income and employment. Health
Economics, 14(9): 955-970.
[19] Devicienti, F., Maida, A., P. Sestito (2007). Downward Wage Rigidity in Italy: Micro-Based
Measures and Implications. The Economic Journal, 117 (November), F530?F552.
[20] Devicienti, F., Grinza, E., Vannoni, D. (2015) The Impact of Part-Time Work on Firm Total
Factor Productivity: Evidence from Italy, Working papers 032, Department of Economics and
Statistics, University of Torino. Turin.
[21] Dobkin C, Finkelstein A, Kluender R, Notowidigdo M J (2018). The economic consequences of
hospital admissions. American Economic Review, volume 108, issue 2, p. 308 - 52
[22] European Commission (1999). Compendium - Good practice in employment of people with
disabilities. Office for Official Pubblications of the European Communities: Luxemburg.
[23] European Commission (2009). Employment in Europe. Office for Official Pubblications of the
European Communities: Luxemburg.
[24] Eurostat (2019), Employment and unemployment; LFS ad-hoc modules: 2002, Employment
of disable persons; series: Employment by type of disability, sex, age and full-time/part-time
employment.
[25] Flores M, Fernańdez M, Pena-Boquete Y. (2019). The impact of health on wages: Evidence
from Europe before and during the Great Recession. Oxford Economic Papers, 1-28 (DOI:
10.1093/oep/gpz033) (available here)
[26] García-Gòmez P., Lopez Nicolaś, A. (2006). Health shocks, employment and income in the
Spanish labour market. Health Economics, 15(9): 997-1009.
[27] García-Gòmez P., Jones, A.M., Rice, N. (2010). Health effects on labour market exits and
entries. Labour Economics, 17(1): 62-76.
41
[28] García-Gòmez, P. (2011). Institutions, health shocks and labour market outcomes across
Europe. Journal of Health Economics, 30(1): 200-213.
[29] Garciá-Gòmez, P., Van Kippersluis, H., O’Donnell, O., van Doorslaer, E. (2013). Long-term
and spillover effects of health shocks on employment and income. Journal of Human Resources.
48 (4), 873-909.
[30] Grossman M. (1972). On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. Journal of
Political Economy, 80(1): 223-255.
[31] Gupta ND, Kleinjans KJ, Larsen M. (2015). The effect of a severe health shock on work behavior:
evidencefrom different health care regimes. Soc Sci Med 2015; 136:44?51.
[32] Haan, P., Myck, M. (2009). Dynamics of health and labour market risks. Journal of Health
Economics, 28(6): 1116-1125.
[33] Hackett, M., Glozier, N., Jan, S., Lindley, R. (2012). Returning to Paid Employment after
Stroke: The Psychosocial Outcomes in Stroke (POISE) Cohort Study. PloS ONE 7(7), e41795.
[34] Hainmueller, J. (2012). Entropy balancing for causal effects: a multivariate reweighting method
to produce balanced samples in observational studies. Political Analysis, 20(1): 25-46.
[35] Hainmueller, J., Xu, Y. (2013). ebalance: A Stata package for entropy balancing. Journal of
Statistical Software, 54, Issue 7: 1-18.
[36] Halla, M., Zweimu¨ller, M. (2013). The effect of health on earnings: Quasi-experimental evidence
from commuting accidents. Labour Economics, 24: 23-38.
[37] Heinesen, E., Kolodziejczyk, C. (2013). Effects of breast and colorectal cancer on labour market
outcomes-average effects and educational gradients. Journal of Health Economics, 32(6): 1028-
1042.
[38] Ho D., Imai K., King G., Stuart E. A., (2007). Matching as Nonparametric Preprocess- ing for
Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference. Political Analysis, 15: 99-236.
[39] Holmlund B. (2014). What do labor market institutions do?.Labour Economics, 30 (2014), pp.
62-69
[40] Iacus, S. M., King, G., Porro, G. (2011). Multivariate Matching Methods That Are Monotonic
Imbalance Bounding. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 106: 345-361.
[41] ISTAT (2017), Annuario Statistico Italiano, chapter 14, Rome.
[42] Jac¨kle R., Himmler O. (2010). Health and Wages: Panel Data Estimates Considering Selection
and Endogeneity. Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 45(2).
42
[43] Jones A.M., Rice N., Zantomio F. (2019). Acute health shocks and labour market outcomes:
evidence from the post crash era. Economics and Human Biology, forthcoming (online version
available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2019.100811).
[44] Lindeboom, M., Llena-Nozal, A., van der Klaauw, B. (2016) Health shocks, disability and work,
Labour Economics 43, 185-200.
[45] Lundborg,P., Nilsson, M., Vikstrom¨, J. (2015). Heterogeneity in the impact of health shocks on
labour outcomes: evidence from Swedish workers. Oxford Economic Papers, 67(3): 715-739.
[46] Maczulskij, T., Boc¨kerman, P. (2019) Harsh times: do stressors lead to labor market losses?
The Euroepan Journal of Health Economics, 20:357?373.
[47] Ministry of Health, 2018. Programma Nazionale Esiti - PNE 2018, available at ht-
tps://pne.agenas.it/index.php
[48] Ministry of Health, 2010. Relazione sullo Stato Sanitario del Paese: 2009-2010. Chapter 2.1.
Rome.
[49] Moran, J., Farley-Short, P., Hollenbeack, C.S. (2011). Long term employment effects of surviving
cancer. Journal of Health Economics, 30(3): 505-514.
[50] European Commission (2009). Employment in Europe 2009. Directorate-General for Employ-
ment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.
[51] OECD, (1994). The Employment Outlook, chapter 5.
[52] OECD, (2014). Older workers scoreboard. Accessed on 16/07/2015 from http://www.oecd.org.
[53] OECD, 2016, Older Workers Scoreboard, accessed on 05/09/2019
[54] OECD, 2017, Structural and Demographic Business Statistics: Structural business statistics
ISIC Rev. 4. Available at: https://data.oecd.org/entrepreneur/enterprises-by-business-size.htm
[55] OECD, 2019, Labor Force Statistics. Available at: OECD.Stat accessed on 6/9/2019. Series:
Incidence of FTPT employment - common definition; Incidence of involuntary part time workers
[56] O’Neill, S., Kreif, N., Greive, R., Sutton, M., Sekhon, J. (2016). Estimating causal effects: con-
sidering three alternatives to difference-in-differences estimation. Health Services and Outcomes
Research Methodology, 16, 1-21
[57] Rosenbaum, P.R., Rubin, D.B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational
studies for causal effects, Biometrika, 70(1): 41-55.
[58] Smith, J. P. (1999). Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets: The Dual Relation between Health and
Economic Status. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(2): 145-166.
43
[59] Smith, J. (2005). Consequences and Predictors of New Health Events, in Wise, D. (ed) Analyses
in the Economics of Ageing, University of Chicago Press.
[60] Spelten, E.R., Sprangers, M.A., Verbeek, J.H., 2002. Factors reported to influence the return
to work of cancer survivors: a literature review. Psycho-oncology 11, 124-131.
[61] Trevisan E., Zantomio F., (2016). The impact of acute health shocks on the labour supply of
older workers: Evidence from sixteen European countries. Labour Economics, 43, 171-185.
[62] Trygged, S., Ahacic, K., Kareholt, I., (2011). Income and Education as predictors of return to
working life among younger stroke patients. BMC Public health 11: 742.
[63] Vestling, M., Ramel, E., Iwarsson, S., (2013). Thoughts and experiences from returning to work
after stroke. Work 45, 201-211.
[64] Wilkins E, Wilson L, Wickramasinghe K, Bhatnagar P, Leal J, Luengo-Fernandez R, Burns
R, Rayner M, Townsend N, (2017). European Cardiovascular Disease Statistics 2017. European
Heart Network, Brussels.
[65] Wu, S. (2003). The Effects of Health Events on the Economic Status of Married Couples. Journal
of Human Resources 38(1): 219-30.
[66] Zissimopoulos, J.M. Karoly L.A. (2007). Transitions to self-employment at older ages: The role
of wealth, health, health insurance and other factors. Labour Economics 14 (2007) 269?295.
[67] Zucchelli, E. , Jones, A.M., Rice, N., Harris, A. (2010). The Effects of Health Shocks on labour
Market Exits: Evidence from the HILDA Survey, Australian Journal of Labour Economics, 13(2):
191-218.
44
Appendices
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Treated Controls
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Year 2004 0.811 2004 0.816
Age 50.73 7.402 39.77 9.591
Abirth_north 0.271 0.445 0.359 0.480
Abirth_center 0.142 0.349 0.133 0.339
Abirth_south&Isl. 0.508 0.500 0.354 0.479
Abirth_abroad 0.079 0.270 0.154 0.361
Country_underdev 0.073 0.260 0.140 0.346
Hosp_cvd_cum 0.037 0.190 0.001 0.034
Days_cvd_cum 0.409 2.870 0.012 0.451
Hosp_other_cum 0.311 0.463 0.190 0.392
Days_other_cum 2.814 7.280 6.211 1.303
Hosp_other_(t¯-1) 0.207 0.611 0.096 0.392
Days_other_(t¯-1) 0.993 4.132 0.440 3.349
Inv_benefit_cum 0.077 0.266 0.007 0.082
Sick_leave_cum 19.28 26.87 10.70 15.87
Work_active_cum 12.37 2.865 10.99 3.542
Nemployee_cum 14.23 3.843 13.20 4.295
Rate_employee_cum 97.01 11.01 97.90 8.996
Jobloss_cum 0.312 0.610 0.324 0.631
New_firm_cum 2.843 2.565 2.937 2.431
Nblue_collar_cum 12.78 4.052 10.84 4.739
Nwhite_collar_cum 0.281 1.430 0.261 1.277
Nmanager_cum 0.001 0.035 0.002 0.082
Rate_perm_cum 94.88 14.67 89.86 20.64
Rate_fullt_cum 96.39 13.59 96.55 12.80
Ever_CIG 0.384 0.486 0.335 0.472
Nunempl_cum 0.393 1.219 0.381 1.116
Unempl_(t¯-1) 0.039 0.193 0.059 0.236
Rate_selfempl_cum 3.699 13.08 2.596 10.95
Days_self_cum 165.5 613.8 130.6 562.9
Rate_atypical_cum 0.403 3.206 0.632 4.258
N_atypical_cum 0.050 0.425 0.062 0.441
Dist_last1_employee 1.044 0.360 1.056 0.386
Dist_last2_employee 2.141 0.796 2.153 0.784
Dist_last3_employee 3.261 1.093 3.267 1.104
Dist_last4_employee 4.391 1.376 4.413 1.408
Last_sick_leave 2.202 5.330 1.156 3.375
Last_weeks_paid 47.57 10.28 45.95 12.01
Last_fix_term 0.041 0.197 0.081 0.272
Last_jtenure 8.911 7.046 6.621 6.053
Last_awork_north 0.484 0.499 0.568 0.495
Last_awork_center 0.179 0.384 0.176 0.381
Last_awork_south&Isl. 0.336 0.473 0.256 0.426
Last_awork_abroad 0 0 0.002 0.015
Last_apprentice 0.001 0.025 0.017 0.127
Last_bluecollar 0.994 0.074 0.976 0.152
Last_whitecollar 0.005 0.070 0.007 0.086
Last_manager 0 0 6.0e(−05) 0.008
Last_director 0 0 3.1e(−05) 0.006
Source: WHIP&Health
45
(continue)
Treated Controls
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Last_firm_015 0.297 0.457 0.368 0.482
Last_firm_16250 0.431 0.495 0.414 0.493
Last_firm_250 0.273 0.445 0.218 0.413
Last_sec_agriculture 0.001 0.025 0.0004 0.019
Last_sec_manufac 0.416 0.493 0.493 0.499
Last_sec_construc 0.169 0.375 0.172 0.377
Last_sec_extraction 0.008 0.089 0.005 0.072
Last_sec_energy 0.018 0.134 0.011 0.105
Last_sec_trade 0.069 0.253 0.101 0.301
Last_sec_foodservices 0.043 0.203 0.046 0210
Last_sec_transports 0.144 0.351 0.088 0.283
Last_sec_finance 0.123 0.329 0.076 0.266
Last_sec_realestate 0.006 0.074 0.003 0.055
Last_public 0.004 0.061 0.005 0.070
Last1_lab_income 22,310 9,468 20,835 11,403
Last2_lab_income 21,822 9,466 20,344 11,340
Last3_lab_income 21,491 9,636 19,851 12,070
Last4_lab_income 21,222 9,918 19,002 11,961
Last1_hwage 11.83 3.785 11.34 6.596
Last2_hwage 11.69 3.701 11.14 6.977
Last3_hwage 11.65 4.459 10.98 9.564
Last4_hwage 11.56 3.796 10.82 15.24
Last1_fulltime 0.950 0.219 0.962 0.191
Last2_fulltime 0.952 0.215 0.965 0.184
Last3_fulltime 0.956 0.204 0.965 0.183
Last4_fulltime 0.956 0.204 0.965 0.184
Last1_LMP 0.981 0.137 0.976 0.152
Last2_LMP 0.964 0.187 0.964 10.87
Last3_LMP 0.949 0.220 0.953 0.212
Last4_LMP 0.934 0.248 0.936 0.244
Source: WHIP&Health
Table A2: Post-CEM reached balance
Pre-CEM Post-CEM
Mean Mean
Treated Controls %bias p-value Treated Controls %bias p-value
Year 2004 2004 1.7 0.503 2004 2004 0.0 1.000
Age 50.73 39.77 127.9 0.000 50.68 50.68 0.0 1.000
Hosp_cvd_cum 0.037 0.001 26.6 0.000 0.024 0.024 0.0 1.000
Dist_last1_employee 1.044 1.056 -3.3 0.205 0.036 0.036 0.0 1.000
Last_fix_term 0.041 0.081 -16.9 0.000 0.036 0.036 0.0 1.000
Last_awork_north 0.484 0.568 -16.8 0.000 0.482 0.482 0.0 1.000
Last_awork_center 0.179 0.176 0.8 0.735 0.182 0.182 0.0 1.000
Last_awork_south&Isl. 0.336 0.256 17.8 0.000 0.336 0.336 0.0 1.000
Last_awork_abroad 0 0.002 -2.2 0.539 0 0 . .
Last_firm_015 0.297 0.368 -15.2 0.000 0.298 0.298 0.0 1.000
Last_firm_16250 0.431 0.414 3.4 0.175 0.431 0.431 0.0 1.000
Last_firm_250 0.273 0.218 12.8 0.000 0.271 0.271 0.0 1.000
Source: WHIP&Health
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Table A3: Post-EB moments balance
Treated group Control group
Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness
Year 2004 0.661 -0.057 2004 0.660 -0.057
Age 50.68 54.73 -0.688 50.68 56.29 -0.673
Abirth_north 0.273 0.199 1.018 0.273 0.199 1.018
Abirth_center 0.507 0.250 -0.028 0.507 0.250 -0.026
Country_underdev 0.072 0.0670 3.31 0.072 0.067 3.310
Hosp_other_(t¯-1) 0.204 0.370 4.536 0.204 0.520 16.08
Days_other_(t¯-1) 0.979 17.05 7.727 0.979 21.54 11.94
Hosp_cvd_cum 0.024 0.024 6.16 0.024 0.024 6.160
Days_cvd_cum 0.282 6.183 13.03 0.282 4.675 9.357
Hosp_other_cum 0.308 0.213 .8336 0.308 0.213 0.834
Days_other_cum 2.766 52.54 4.647 2.766 78.34 8.239
Inv_benefit_cum 0.068 0.064 3.423 0.068 0.063 3.423
Sick_leave_cum 19.10 711.9 3.095 19.09 859.1 3.650
Work_active_cum 12.41 8.049 -1.496 12.41 7.983 -1.469
Nemployee_cum 14.27 14.71 0.008 14.27 14.86 0.710
Rate_employee_cum 96.98 123 -4.038 96.98 125.5 -4.102
Jobloss_cum 0.315 0.371 2.184 0.315 .4247 3.886
New_firm_cum 2.846 6.645 2.731 2.847 6.495 2.463
Nblue_collar_cum 12.82 16.26 -0.24 12.82 15.53 -0.224
Nwhite_collar_cum 0.271 1.995 7.908 0.271 1.921 9.001
Nmanager_cum 0.001 0.001 28.2 0.001 0.003 67.35
Rate_perm_cum 95.11 202.5 -3.851 95.11 214.4 -3.903
Rate_fullt_cum 96.64 170.9 -5.045 96.64 172.4 -4.967
Ever_CIG 0.385 0.237 0.474 0.385 0.237 0.474
Nunempl_cum 0.384 1.398 4.285 0.384 1.394 4.171
Unempl_(t¯-1) 0.039 0.037 4.773 0.039 0.037 4.773
Rate_selfempl_cum 3.748 173.4 3.876 3.748 180.3 4.039
Days_self_cum 168.4 3837 4.341 168.4 3974 4.485
Rate_atypical_cum 0.374 9.055 10.79 0.374 10.25 11.97
N_atypical_cum 0.046 0.153 12.39 0.046 0.200 19.63
Dist_last1_employee 1.036 0.106 11.18 1.036 0.103 11.06
Dist_last2_employee 2.130 0.600 8.096 2.130 0.560 7.724
Dist_last3_employee 3.249 1.161 5.538 3.249 1.189 5.605
Dist_last4_employee 4.375 1.843 4.574 4.375 1.850 4.475
Last_sick_leave 2.167 27.73 4.404 2.167 31.37 6.268
Last_jtenure 8.952 49.57 0.331 8.952 49.18 0.338
Last_weeks_paid 47.65 102.9 -2.644 47.65 105 -2.625
Last_fix_term 0.036 0.034 5.004 0.036 0.034 5.002
Last_awork_north 0.182 0.149 1.651 0.182 0.149 1.651
Last_awork_center 0.336 0.223 0.695 0.3358 0.223 0.695
Last_apprentice 0 0 . 0.00004 0.00003 165.9
Last_bluecollar 0.996 0.004 -15 0.996 0.004 -14.93
Last_whitecollar 0.004 0.004 15 0.004 0.004 15
Last_manager 0 0 . 1.12e−06 1.12e−06 944.7
Last_firm_015 0.298 0.209 0.882 0.298 0.209 0.882
Last_firm_16250 0.431 0.245 0.278 0.431 0.245 0.278
Source: WHIP&Health
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(continue)
Treated group Control group
Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness
Last_sec_agriculture 0.001 0.002 39.91 0.001 0.001 39.91
Last_sec_extraction 0.008 0.008 10.94 0.008 0.008 10.94
Last_sec_manufac 0.420 0.244 0.325 0.420 0.244 0.325
Last_sec_energy 0.019 0.018 7.087 0.019 0.018 7.087
Last_sec_construc 0.170 0.141 1.759 0.170 0.141 1.759
Last_sec_trade 0.068 0.064 3.423 0.068 0.064 3.423
Last_sec_foodservices 0.043 0.041 4.492 0.043 0.041 4.492
Last_sec_transports 0.144 0.123 2.034 0.1435 0.123 2.034
Last_sec_finance 0.119 0.105 2.353 0.119 0.104 2.353
Last_sec_realestate 0.006 0.006 13.20 0.006 0.006 13.20
Last1_lab_income 22429 8.86e+07 0.529 22429 3.02e+08 118.6
Last2_lab_income 21922 8.91e+07 0.330 21922 1.06e+08 34.40
Last3_lab_income 21620 9.19e+07 0.220 21619 1.11e+08 13.91
Last4_lab_income 21337 9.72e+07 0.153 21337 9.99e+07 0.491
Last1_fulltime 0.956 0.043 -4.419 0.956 0.043 -4.419
Last2_fulltime 0.956 0.043 -4.419 0.956 0.043 -4.419
Last3_fulltime 0.961 0.037 -4.773 0.960 0.037 -4.773
Last4_fulltime 0.960 0.039 -4.688 0.960 0.038 -4.688
Last1_LMP 0.984 0.015 -7.801 0.984 0.015 -7.799
Last2_LMP 0.966 0.033 -5.157 0.966 0.033 -5.157
Last3_LMP .0950 0.048 -4.123 0.950 0.048 -4.123
Last4_LMP 0.937 0.059 -3.609 0.937 0.059 -3.609
Last1_hwage 11.85 14.30 1.211 11.85 84.27 111.1
Last2_hwage 11.72 13.69 1.033 11.72 25.52 73.04
Last3_hwage 11.67 20.01 7.690 11.67 223.6 215.2
Last4_hwage 11.61 14.24 1.035 11.61 15.11 2.313
Source: WHIP&Health
48
Table A4: Unconditional employment-related outcomes: ATTs
CVD shock experienced in 2003/2004 CVD shock experienced in 2003
Probability of Annual income Probability of Annual income
employment from employment employment from employment
Time τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
t¯ - -951.2*** - -1290.6***
Rob. SE. - (241.5) - (324.5)
N. treated - 1042 - 503
t¯+1 -0.039*** -2661.5*** -0.040** -2914.7***
Rob. SE. (0.011) (339.5) (0.015) (460.4)
N. treated 1043 1043 503 503
t¯+2 -0.088*** -2549.4*** -0.078*** -2808.1***
Rob. SE. (0.013) (367.2) (0.019) (503.5)
N. treated 1043 1043 503 503
t¯+3 -0.097*** -2391.8*** -0.111*** -2307.0***
Rob. SE. (0.014) (380.2) (0.020) (528.8)
N. treated 1043 1043 503 503
t¯+4 -0.082*** -2259.5*** -0.093*** -2555.6***
Rob. SE. (0.014) (390.1) (0.020) (539.2)
N. treated 1043 1043 503 503
t¯+5 -0.080*** -2271.3*** -0.067*** -2490.8***
Rob. SE. (0.014) (380.7) (0.020) (525.9)
N. treated 1043 1043 503 503
t¯+6 -0.070*** -1816.1*** -0.065*** -2105.8***
Rob. SE. (0.014) (368.4) (0.020) (497.3)
N. treated 1043 1043 503 503
t¯+7 -0.067*** -1669.1*** -0.062*** -2016.9***
Rob. SE. (0.014) (363.5) (0.019) (485.2)
N. treated 1043 1043 503 503
t¯+8 -0.057*** -1608.8*** -0.061*** -2086.9***
Rob. SE. (0.013) (344.6) (0.019) (456.5)
N. treated 1043 1043 503 503
t¯+9 - - -0.086*** -2326.1***
Rob. SE. - - (0.017) (412.8)
N. treated - - 503 503
Source: WHIP&Health
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Table A5: Employment-related unconditional outcomes by fixed-term jobs: ATT and Relative Effect
Fixed-term job Permanent job
Probability of Probability of
labour market activity labour market activity
Time τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
t¯ - - - -
Rob. SE. - - - -
N. treated - - - -
t¯+1 -0.130*** -14.27 -0.033*** -3.65
Rob. SE. (0.045) (0.009)
N. treated 54 1539
t¯+2 -0.138** -16.34 -0.085*** -10.24
Rob. SE. (0.055) (0.011)
N. treated 56 1539
t¯+3 -0.169** -21.17 -0.093*** -12.18
Rob. SE. (0.061) (0.011)
N. treated 56 1539
t¯+4 -0.068 -10.28 -0.078*** -11.23
Rob. SE. (0.057) (0.012)
N. treated 57 1539
t¯+5 -0.058 -9.45 -0.079*** -12.56
Rob. SE. (0.056) (0.012)
N. treated 57 1539
t¯+6 -0.045 -7.77 -0.080*** -13.76
Rob. SE. (0.054) (0.012)
N. treated 57 1539
t¯+7 -0.124** -23.45 -0.067*** -12.78
Rob. SE. (0.057) (0.011)
N. treated 57 1539
Source: WHIP&Health
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Table A6: Employment-related unconditional outcomes by full-time jobs: ATT and Relative Effect
Full-time job Part-time job
Probability of Probability of
labour market activity labour market activity
Time τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
τˆt¯+v
τˆt¯+v
Y 0
i,t¯+v
t¯ - - - -
Rob. SE. - - - -
N. treated - - - -
t¯+1 -0.037*** -4.13 0.025 2.81
Rob. SE. (0.009) (0.040)
N. treated 1525 70
t¯+2 -0.088*** -10.60 -0.052 -6.67
Rob. SE. (0.011) (0.054)
N. treated 1525 71
t¯+3 -0.095*** -12.50 -0.073 -10.16
Rob. SE. (0.011) (0.058)
N. treated 1525 71
t¯+4 -0.079*** -11.39 -0.023 3.42
Rob. SE. (0.012) (0.057)
N. treated 1525 70
t¯+5 -0.078*** -12.30 -0.090 -14.94
Rob. SE. (0.012) (0.058)
N. treated 1525 70
t¯+6 -0.077*** -13.34 -0.093 -16.86
Rob. SE. (0.011) (0.057)
N. treated 1525 70
t¯+7 -0.069*** -13.03 -0.053 -10.63
Rob. SE. (0.011) (0.057)
N. treated 1525 70
Source: WHIP&Health
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